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Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie
Doctrine and Federal Common Law: Stewart
Organization v. Ricoh Corporation
Ricoh Corporation, a manufacturer of copy machines, and
the Stewart Organization, a wholesale distributor, signed a
dealer sales agreement that required that any litigation in con-
nection with the contract be initiated in New York City.1 In
spite of the forum selection clause,2 the Stewart Organization
brought suit under the contract in an Alabama federal district
court. Ricoh moved for transfer of the case to New York.3
The district court refused to transfer the case, holding that
state law governed the forum selection clause and that the
1. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 645 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd
per curiam on rehearing en banc, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir.), cert granted, 108
S. Ct. 225 (1987). The actual clause read as follows:
Dealer and Ricoh agree that this Agreement, and all documents
issued in connection therewith, shall be governed by and interpreted
in accordance with the laws of the State of New York. Dealer and
Ricoh agree that any appropriate state or federal district court located
in the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under or in
connection with this Agreement and shall be a proper forum in which
to adjudicate such case or controversy.
Id. at 645 n.2. The clause included a choice of law provision requiring that liti-
gation be governed by New York law. Id.
2. Forum selection clause is the most common term used to refer to con-
tractual provisions specifying the place for litigation arising out of a contract.
Forum selection clauses can be exclusive, nonexclusive, or applicable to one
party only. Exclusive clauses require litigation to be brought only in the desig-
nated forum. Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 148
(N.D. Tex. 1979). Nonexclusive clauses allow litigation in the designated fo-
rum but do not limit the parties to the designated forum. Nonexclusive
clauses are often referred to as consent to jurisdiction clauses. Hunt Wesson
Foods v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987). Clauses limited to
one party only generally seek to bind the party with multiple venue options
and protect the other party from having to defend a lawsuit in a distant forum.
Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 656 F.
Supp. 464, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1988). In the termi-
nology of civil law, these clauses are referred to as prorogation clauses by the
contractual forum state and derogation clauses by the excluded forum state.
See Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commer-
cial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 134-36 (discussing distinctions be-
tween exclusive, nonexclusive, and one-party forum selection clauses).
3. 779 F.2d at 645.
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clause was invalid as against Alabama public policy.4 On inter-
locutory appeal, an Eleventh Circuit panel reversed and re-
manded, ordering transfer of the case to New York.5 The
Eleventh Circuit reheard the case en banc and affirmed the
panel decision.6 In Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.,7 the
en banc court held that in diversity cases federal law governs
the enforceability of forum selection clauses and that the forum
selection clause at issue was enforceable.8
The enforceability of forum selection clauses is an area of
extensive litigation in federal and state courts.9 In addressing
this question, the federal circuits have differed on whether
state or federal law should govern in diversity cases.10
Although the Ricoh court applied federal law, two other cir-
cuits have held that state law governs the issue.1 1
The Eleventh Circuit is the first appeals court to analyze
the forum selection issue under the Erie doctrine.'2 Although
application of federal law would lend stability and predictabil-
ity to contracts between interstate or international parties and
would minimize the impact of the states' nonuniform treatment
4. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir.) (en banc)
(per curiam), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987). The district court cited Red-
wing Carriers v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980), in which the Supreme
Court of Alabama refused to enforce a forum selection clause because it would
completely divest Alabama courts of jurisdiction. See 810 F.2d at 1069-70. The
Redwing Carriers court stated "We consider contract provisions which at-
tempt to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of this state to be invalid and un-
enforceable as being contrary to public policy." Redwing Carriers, 382 So. 2d
at 556.
5. 779 F.2d at 651.
6. 810 F.2d at 1071.
7. 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir.) (en bane) (per curiam), cert granted, 108 S.
Ct. 225 (1987).
8. Id. at 1068. During the printing of this issue, the United States
Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming and remanding the case. See Stew-
art Organization v. Ricoh Corp., 56 U.S.L.W. 4659 (U.S. June 21, 1988) (No. 86-
1908).
9. A WESTLAW search for cases just since 1980 on the topic produces
211 federal cases and 50 state cases. The query is: synopsis (forum Is choice
selection) & date (after 1979).
10. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
12. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The Erie Doctrine con-
sists of Erie and its progeny. See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
Federal law will govern if the enforceability of forum selection clauses is a
procedural issue, but state law governs if it is a substantive issue. See infra
notes 38-40. Forum selection clauses are procedural to the extent that they af-
fect the location of litigation. They are also substantive provisions of the con-
tract about which the parties have bargained. See infra notes 15-16, 101 and
accompanying text.
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of forum selection clauses,13 adoption of the Ricoh court's Erie
analysis would damage longstanding Erie principles and would
risk an unwarranted expansion of the application of federal law
in diversity cases.
While approving the result in Ricoh, this Comment criti-
ques the Eleventh Circuit's Eie analysis and presents alterna-
tive grounds for the application of federal law to forum
selection clauses. Part I reviews the history of the enforceabil-
ity of forum selection clauses and sets forth the current scope
and meaning of the Erie doctrine. Part II summarizes the Elev-
enth Circuit's decision in Ricoh and critiques the court's analy-
sis. After finding that the en banc majority reached the correct
result through flawed reasoning, the Comment proposes a new
analysis of forum selection clause enforceability in diversity
suits. The Comment concludes that courts should create lim-
ited federal common law enforcing forum selection clauses in
diversity cases to best serve the underlying principles of the
Erie doctrine and the expectations of contracting parties.
I. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES AND THE
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW IN
DIVERSITY CASES
Parties to a contract normally seek to create the greatest
possible predictability in their contractual relationship.14 Liti-
gation over a contract dispute provides an area of potential un-
certainty because under federal venue statutes, which prescribe
where parties may initiate an action in federal courts, the fo-
rum for contract litigation could be in any of several different
courts. As a result, contracting parties cannot predict safely
either the location of the litigation or the applicable substantive
law.
A forum selection clause creates predictability by specify-
ing where litigation will take place in the event of a contract
dispute. Most contracts containing a forum selection clause also
contain a choice of law clause specifying that the forum's state
13. In 1972 the Supreme Court departed from the historical judicial disap-
proval of forum selection clauses when it decided that in admiralty cases fo-
rum selection clauses are prima facie valid. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). Many federal courts apply The Bremen in diversity
cases as governing federal law. See infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
14. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13; see Covey & Morris, The Enforceability of
Agreements Providing for Forum and Choice of Law Selection, 61 DENvER
L.J. 837, 837 (1984); Gruson, supra note 2, at 133.
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law will govern contract disputes.1 5 Specifying the forum and
choice of law allows the parties to negotiate with certainty as to
the cost and convenience of litigation. In addition, forum selec-
tion clauses affect the parties' substantive rights because the se-
lected forum and law may dictate the outcome of contractual
disputes. As a result, the clauses are normally a subject of bar-
gaining at the contracting stage. Contractual agreement on fo-
rum is, consequently, a matter of convenience and a substantive
provision affecting the consideration exchanged in the
agreement.16
Whether the parties to the contract achieve their goals,
however, depends on the enforceability 17 of the forum selection
clause. Enforceability may vary because some jurisdictions en-
force forum selection clauses and others do not.18 When state
law and federal law conflict 19 on such an issue in a federal di-
versity case, the court must decide which law to apply by refer-
ence to the Erie doctrine.20 Proper application of Erie to this
issue, however, depends on an understanding of the state and
15. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 133-34; supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying
text. Forum selection clause enforcement will assure the parties that the con-
tractual choice of law will govern any disputes.
16. Because a forum selection clause is a term of the contract, the clause
reflects the bargained-for agreement of the parties. The clause may have af-
fected monetary consideration or other terms of the contract. If a court does
not enforce the forum selection clause, the equities of the agreement may be
shifted. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13-14.
17. Courts usually prefer to refer to enforceability, rather than validity, of
forum selection clauses. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 136 n.8.
18. The question of which law governs enforcement of a forum selection
clause usually arises when a federal court hearing a diversity case is not lo-
cated in the contractual forum and one party seeks a transfer to the contrac-
tual forum. See Covey & Morris, supra note 14, at 840. The party seeking to
transfer the case to the contractual forum may invoke either the federal
change of venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982), or the federal provision
for cure of defects in venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982). Sectionl404(a) pro-
vides, "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). Section 1406(a)
provides, "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue
in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of jus-
tice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971) (stating that "[tihe parties' agreement as to the
place of the action ... will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable").
19. In this Comment, the term conflict of laws refers to the question of
whether federal or state law should apply to a diversity issue. The term choice
of law refers to the question of which state's law will govern the merits of a
controversy.
20. See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
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federal rules governing enforcement of forum selection clauses
and the policies underlying those rules.
A. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE ENFORCEMENT
Historically, American courts disapproved of forum selec-
tion clauses as a matter of policy.21 The primary basis for re-
fusing to enforce the clauses was the judicial conviction that
prelitigation agreements ousting a court of jurisdiction were an-
tithetical to the autonomy of the courts.22 In a 1972 admiralty
case, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,2 the United States
Supreme Court altered the traditional approach by holding that
forum selection clauses are prima facie valid2 and enforceable
if reasonable.25 In so holding, the Court emphasized that wor-
ries over court autonomy should not impair the freedom to con-
tract or the expansion of trade.2 6
21. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 138-39.
22. Carbon Black Export v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); see also Annotation, Validity of
Contractual Provisions Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be
Brought, 31 A.L.R.4TH 404, 409 (1984) (noting some courts' view that forum se-
lection clauses are invalid). Another rationale for disapproving forum selec-
tion clauses was that the clauses relate to the law of remedies that depends
upon the law of the forum and hence cannot be altered by private contract.
See Gruson, supra note 2, at 139.
23. 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (involving international towage contract).
24. See supra note 17.
25. 407 U.S. at 10. The Court noted that the argument that forum selec-
tion clauses are unenforceable because they "oust" a court of jurisdiction "is
hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction." Id. at 12.
The shift toward enforcement of forum selection clauses was presaged in
1949 by Judge Learned Hand, who wrote:
[B]e the original reasons good or bad, courts have for long looked with
strong disfavor upon contracts by which a party surrenders resort to
any forum which was lawfully open to him.... In truth, I do not be-
lieve that, today at least, there is an absolute taboo against such con-
tracts at all; in the words of the Restatement, they are invalid only
when unreasonable .... What remains of the doctrine is apparently
no more than a general hostility, which can be overcome, but which
nevertheless does persist.
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 560-61 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J., con-
curring) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949); see also Win. H.
Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.) (enforcing
forum selection clause), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), overruled on other
grounds, Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1967) (en
banc).
26. 407 U.S. at 9. In rejecting the traditional approach, the Court in The
Bremen said that "[t]he expansion of American business and industry will
hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a pa-
rochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our law and in our
courts." Id. The conflict between the preservation of the courts' jurisdiction
1094 [Vol. 72:1090
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Since The Bremen the issue of forum selection clause en-
forceability has arisen in state courts and in federal diversity
cases. Because federal admiralty law does not necessarily apply
to a contract dispute in state court,27 subsequent state decisions
have reacted to The Bremen in a variety of ways. Some states
continue to view forum selection clauses as unenforceable.28
Other states have either enacted statutes or interpreted ex-
isting venue laws to enforce reasonable forum selection
and the goal of encouraging trade highlights the problematic nature of forum
selection clauses as both procedural and substantive in nature.
The reasonableness test used in The Bremen established three grounds for
denying enforcement of a forum selection clause. 407 U.S. at 15. The Court
would enforce forum selection clauses when "[t]he choice of ... forum was
made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated busi-
nessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be
honored by the parties and enforced by the courts." Id. at 12. If the resisting
party demonstrates that the contract is unreasonable under all the circum-
stances, a court can refuse to enforce the clause. Id. at 15. The Court ex-
plained that an opposing party will show unreasonableness only if "for all
practical purposes [he] will be deprived of his day in court." Id. at 18.
In addition, a court can deny enforcement if the forum selection clause it-
self was the result of fraud or overreaching. Id. at 15. This affirmative defense
is a standard basis for voiding a contract. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§§ 4.12, 4.20 (1982). The fraud must have induced the specific clause, not the
contract as a whole, to trigger this exception to enforcement. See Covey &
Morris, supra note 14, at 842, 855.
Finally, a court can deny enforcement if it would "contravene a strong
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought." 407 U.S. at 15. The prin-
cipal concern of the Court was that the law to be applied by the contractual
forum should not create an outcome contrary to an important public policy or
to a substantive right or protection for citizens of the state in which the fed-
eral court is located. Gruson, supra note 2, at 170-71. For example, when the
law of the contractual forum had changed after the formation of a contract,
enforcement of the forum selection clause might result in an outcome differ-
ent from that which the parties anticipated at the time of contracting. Courts
assume that parties know the law in the respective jurisdictions considered for
selection as the exclusive forum for contract disputes as long as arms length
negotiation created the contract. Cf. Hoffman v. National Equip. Rental, 643
F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that ignorance due to failure to read con-
tract is not an excuse).
27. Federal substantive law governs admiralty matters. 19 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4514, at 256
(1982).
28. States that hold forum selection clauses unenforceable as against pub-
lic policy include Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, and Texas. See Red-
wing Carriers v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Allen,
436 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam), review denied, 446
So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984); Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, 132
Ga. App. 748, 748, 209 S.E. 2d 132, 133 (1974); State ex rel. Gooseneck Trailer
Mfg. Co. v. Barker, 619 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Dowling v. NADW
Mktg., 578 S.W.2d 475, 475-76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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clauses.29 At least one state views forum selection clauses as
merely one factor to consider when ruling on a motion to trans-
fer venue on grounds of forum non conveniens.30
Federal court use of The Bremen in diversity cases also has
varied. As an admiralty case, The Bremen does not bind federal
courts in other areas of law.31 Nevertheless, in some diversity
cases, federal courts have applied The Bremen to determine the
enforceability of forum selection clauses because they found no
conflict between state law and the federal law expressed in The
Bremen.32 In other diversity cases, courts have applied The
Bremen despite a conflict between federal and state law.33 In
contrast, only the Third and Eighth Circuits have held that
29. See, e.g., Deeb, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 196 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (venue statute allows corporations to waive venue); N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 501 (McKinney 1976) (written agreement fixing place of
trial, made before an action is commenced, shall be enforced); Annotation,
supra note 22, at 441; see also Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the
United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J. COmp. L. 124, 135 (1973) (tracing
development of law of forum selection clauses prior to The Bremen). The ap-
proach states and their courts take is relevant to the current status of forum
selection clauses in diversity if state law is found to apply in diversity. See in-
fra note 34.
30. See Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d
432, 437 (Iowa 1982) (using forum selection clause as factor in court's discre-
tionary decision whether to exercise its legal jurisdiction).
31. See Pelleport Investors v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 279
(9th Cir. 1984); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 720-21 (2d
Cir. 1982).
32. See Mercury Coal & Coke v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696
F.2d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1982); Hoffman v. National Equip. Rental Ltd., 643 F.2d
987, 991 (4th Cir. 1981); Moretti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assocs., 668 F.
Supp. 103, 106 (D.R.I. 1987); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems, 570 F.
Supp. 708, 711-12 (D.R.I. 1983); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 568
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Some courts have applied The Bremen, despite specifically holding that
state law applies, because the state law was the same as The Bremen. See
Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (S.D.W. Va.
1976); Davis v. Pro-Basketball, 381 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
33. See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir.) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987); Visicorp v. Software
Arts, 575 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr.
Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147 n.1, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
Federal courts applying The Bremen in diversity cases, without discussing
whether state and federal law conflict, include Pelleport Investors, 741 F.2d at
279; Bense, 683 F.2d at 720-21; In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rican For-
warding Co., 492 F.2d 1294, 1296 (1st Cir. 1974); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van
Dusen Air, 466 F.2d 220, 234 n.24 (6th Cir. 1972) (dictum); Midwest Mechanical
Contractors v. Tampa Constructors, 659 F. Supp. 526, 530 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (dic-
tum); Gordonsville Indus. v. American Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 205-06
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FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
when federal and state law conflict, state law determines the
enforceability of forum selection clauses in diversity suits.3
(W.D. Va. 1982); Process & Storage Vessels v. Tank Serv., 541 F. Supp. 725,
732-33 (D. Del. 1982), cff'd mem., 760 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1985).
Courts adopting the reasonableness test of The Bremen have recognized
that the parties to a contract cannot oust the forum court of jurisdiction by
their agreement. Based on such clauses, these courts have refrained from ex-
ercising their jurisdiction to give effect to the contractual intentions of the par-
ties. The Bremen Court noted that the "ouster" argument is "hardly more
than a vestigial legal fiction." 407 U.S. at 12; see Quick Erectors v. Seattle
Bronze Corp., 524 F. Supp. 351, 355 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Anastasi Bros. Corp. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F. Supp. 862, 863-64 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kline v.
Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Minn. 1980); Hoes of Am. v. Hoes,
493 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (C.D. M. 1979); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp.,
474 F. Supp. 145, 148-49 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v.
American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071, 1072 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Spatz v. Nascone,
364 F. Supp. 967, 974 (W.D. Pa. 1973); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971); supra note 18; cf. Central Contracting Co. v. C.E.
Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 133, 209 A.2d 810, 816 (Pa. 1965) (stating that
court having jurisdiction should decline to proceed with cause when forum se-
lection clause is reasonable).
34. In General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352 (3d
Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit held that state law governs the enforceability of
forum selection clauses because no federal interest mandates displacing state
law with the federal common law of The Bremen. Id. at 357. The Eighth Cir-
cuit, in Farmland Indus. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.
1986), applied state law to the enforcement of a forum selection clause, holding
that because of the close relationship between substance and procedure, the
state public policy prohibiting enforcement of the clauses should be given ef-
fect. Id. at 852; see also Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp. 977,
984 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (citing General Engtg to support the holding that state
law governs enforceability of forum selection clauses), qf'd mem., 838 F.2d
1215 (6th Cir. 1988); Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Barry, 646 F.
Supp. 831, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (clause governed by state law); cf. Patten Sec.
Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, 819 F.2d 400, 407 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[a]
forum selection clause ... does not enjoy such federal favor" and should be
unenforceable if it violates strong public policy in the forum where suit is
brought). But see Sun World Lines v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066,
1069 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that in diversity cases federal law governs
forum selection clauses because they are procedural); Midwest Mechanical
Contractors, 659 F. Supp at 530 (holding that federal law determines validity of
forum selection clause). The Second Restatement of Conflicts has adopted a
test similar to The Bremen for resolving forum selection clause issues. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 80 (1971).
If state law governs the enforceability of forum selection clauses, the ulti-
mate decision of enforceability will depend on whether courts apply the con-
tractual choice of law or the law of the state in which the deciding court is
located. The General Eng'g and Farmland Indus. courts both applied the law
of the state in which they were located. In the former the clause was enforce-
able, and in the latter it was not. Most courts applying state law to the ques-
tion of enforceability have applied the contractual choice of law, resulting in
uniform outcomes regardless of which circuit is deciding the matter. See
Gruson, supra note 2, at 185-86.
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Although recent court decisions in diversity cases have ad-
dressed the question of whether state or federal law applies to
forum selection clauses, no circuit court before Ricoh employed
a detailed Erie doctrine analysis.3 5
B. THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT SCOPE OF THE ERiE
DOCTRINE
The current law governing conflicts between federal and
state law in diversity cases is embodied in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins 36 and its progeny. The Erie decision, based on the
Rules of Decision Act,37 assures plaintiffs that the same law
will apply to a case in state or federal court. Erie requires fed-
eral courts hearing diversity suits to apply state law to substan-
tive issues38 and abolishes general federal common law.39
35. Most circuits have applied federal law to enforcement of forum selec-
tion clauses without using the Erie analysis. See Andrews v. Heinold Com-
modities, 771 F.2d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1985) (dictum); Pelleport Investors, 741
F.2d at 279; Mercury Coal & Coke v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696
F.2d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1982); Bense, 683 F.2d at 721; In re Fireman's Fund Ins.
Cos., 588 F.2d at 95; Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding
Co., 492 F.2d at 1296; In-Flight Devices Corp., 466 F.2d at 234 n.24 (dictum);
Furbee v. Vantage Press, 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Although they failed to undertake a thorough Erie analysis, both the
Third and Eighth Circuits mentioned Erie. The Eighth Circuit noted that the
hybrid procedural and substantive nature of forum selection clauses compli-
cated the Erie analysis. See Sun World Lines, 801 F.2d at 1069; see also Taylor,
474 F. Supp. at 147 (noting that forum selection clause is not purely procedural
matter).
Although the convenience goals of forum selection clauses are character-
ized easily as procedural issues, the choice of law implications of the clauses
and their creation through contractual negotiation are usually regarded as sub-
stantive issues. See supra notes 12, 15 and accompanying text.
36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). The Rules of Decision Act, authorized by Sec-
tion 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that "[t]he laws of the
several states... shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982).
38. 304 U.S. at 78. The Ere rule is:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of fed-
eral concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has
no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State.
Id.
39. Common law is defined as "those principles, usages and rules of action
... which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive decla-
ration of the will of the legislature." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 144 (abridged
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After Erie, federal courts had difficulty distinguishing be-
tween substantive issues and procedural issues.40 The Supreme
Court attempted to clarify Erie in three subsequent decisions.4 '
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,42 the Court created an outcome-
determinative test for issues that are arguably procedural.43
Under the test, courts must apply state law when the case
would be decided differently under federal law than under
state law. Applying this test, the Guaranty Trust Court held
that state statutes of limitations must apply in diversity suits.
The outcome-determinative test was modified in Byrd v.
5th ed. 1983); see also infra note 131 (further limiting definition of common
law). The federal general common law is based on the fallacy that there exists
"a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute." Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 304 U.S. at 79-80.
Swift, in effect for almost 100 years, allowed federal courts to apply federal
common law to issues of general law, but not to issues of local law. In Swift
Justice Story interpreted the Rules of Decision Act to require application only
of state statutes and state court decisions regarding "local" matters, for exam-
ple, real estate and immovable property, but to leave to federal common law
other "general" matters including "general commercial law," 41 U.S. at 18-19,
and "obligations under contracts entered into and to be performed within the
state," Erie, 304 U.S. at 75. The goal of the Swift decision, as interpreted in
Erie, was increased uniformity in commercial law. Id.
40. The majority decision in Erie does not comment on this dichotomy but
merely refers to "substantive rules of common law." 304 U.S. at 78. Justice
Reed, however, concurring in part, stated, "The line between procedural and
substantive law is hazy, but no one doubts federal power over procedure." Id.
at 92.
The definition of procedural is also hazy. Procedural rules are "designed
to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolu-
tion of disputes." Substantive law can be defined as law governing a right
granted for some purpose not related to "the fairness or efficiency of the litiga-
tion process." Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724-25
(1974).
41. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27,
§ 4505 (containing extensive discussion of Erie Doctrine).
42. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
43. Id. at 109. In Guaranty Trust the issue was whether state or federal
statutes of limitations would be applied in a diversity case. Id. The Court held
that statutes of limitations are substantive law and are governed by state law.
Id. Although it found statutes of limitations to be at least arguably procedural,
the Court applied state law because applying federal law would alter the out-
come of the case. Id. at 109-10. The Court also noted that statutes of limita-
tion bear "vitally" on a state-created right, "not merely formally or
negligibly." Id.
The Guaranty Trust Court also held that the Rules of Decision Act ap-
plies to suits in equity as well as suits in law. The result is the Erie doctrine
applies to all diversity cases, regardless of the claimed remedy. Id. at 105-07.
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Blue Ridge Cooperative," in which the Court added a balancing
test weighing federal interests in uniform process against state
interests in uniform results.45 The Court suggested a strong
federal interest could justify application of federal law to an is-
sue despite the possibility that use of federal law would alter
the outcome of the case.46 In Byrd the Court found the re-
quirement of a jury trial to be a "housekeeping function" of the
federal courts with a sufficiently strong federal interest to jus-
tify rejection of state law.47
In the third major post-Erie case, a direct conflict between
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and a state procedural
rule49 led to a refinement of the Byrd balancing test. In Hanna
v. Plumer,50 the Court held that in a direct collision between a
valid51 federal procedural rule and a state rule, the federal rule
44. 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (Court was correct in finding outcome-determinative
test proves too much); see supra note 43.
45. 356 U.S. at 537-38; see also Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643,
646 (11th Cir. 1986), qff'd per curiam on rehearing en banc, 810 F.2d 1066
(11th Cir.), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987). In Byrd federal law mandating
a jury trial conflicted with state law calling for trial before a judge. 356 U.S. at
538. Applying the outcome-determinative test, the Court found that it could
be argued that the jury would find differently than the judge alone. Id. at 538-
40. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the strong federal policy regarding
jury decisions is to be followed in diversity cases because the likelihood of a
different result is not great enough to outweigh the federal procedure of re-
quiring the jury to decide disputed factual issues. Id. at 540. The Court's deci-
sion did not provide guidance as to how it found the federal rule more
important than state law. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILER & E. COOPER, supra note
27, § 4504, at 33-34.
46. 356 U.S. at 537-40.
47. Id.
48. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are an implementation of Con-
gress's mandate to the Supreme Court to establish rules of civil practice and
procedure in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
49. For purposes of this Comment, the term procedural rule includes all
legislatively enacted rules governing the method of court operation. Federal
procedural rules include the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 28 of
the United States Code. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTS 382-83
(4th ed. 1983).
50. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1),
allowing service of process at the residence of the person being served, con-
flicted with Massachusetts General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Chapter 197, Section 9,
which required in-hand service of process. Applying Massachusetts law would
have entitled the plaintiff to summary judgment in her favor and ended the
lawsuit because the defendant was not served personally. Applying federal
law, the litigation would have continued and the defendant might have pre-
vailed. Id. at 473.
51. A federal procedural rule is valid when it is within the constitutional
grant of power to the judiciary embodied in the Rules Enabling Act. The stan-
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governs even though application of the federal rule might alter
the outcome of the case.52 The Court, in dictum, added a fur-
ther rule: When a federal-state procedural conflict exists, but
no federal procedural rule is directly on point, courts should ap-
ply the outcome-determinative test.5 3 The court noted the out-
come-determinative test should be read "with reference to the
twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."
Presently the Erie doctrine requires that in federal diver-
sity cases, courts apply a valid federal procedural rule when the
federal rule directly conflicts with a state rule.55 In diversity
cases in which procedure and substance cannot be clearly sepa-
rated,56 federal law must replace a competing state law only if
the federal interest is strong and the federal law does not alter
the outcome of the case in a manner that encourages forum
shopping or that results in the inequitable administration of the
laws.51 When the conflicting federal and state laws are clearly
dard set forth by the Court for determining the validity of a federal procedural
rule is "whether a rule really regulates procedure-the judicial process for en-
forcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly adminis-
tering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); see also Westen & Lehman, Is There Life
for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MicH. L. REv. 311, 360 (1980) (the
federal rule must not abridge substantive rights as defined by applicable state
law).
52. 380 U.S. at 471-72. The Court wrote: 'To hold that a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforc-
ing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant
of power over federal procedure or Congress's attempt to exercise that power
in the Enabling Act." Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court distinguished the issue in Hanna from prior Erie cases by not-
ing that the Rules Enabling Act governs the validity of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and therefore the Erie doctrine was not the correct test. 380
U.S. at 470-71.
53. Id. at 470.
54. Id. at 468 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 470. As the Hanna Court noted-
[Tihere have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state
rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by
one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not
that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsis-
tent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not
as broad as the losing party urged, and, therefore, there being no Fed-
eral Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the en-
forcement of state law.
Id.
56. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
57. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468; see also C. WRIGHT, A. ILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 27, § 4504, at 44. The Court has incorporated both Guaranty Trust
and Byrd by considering outcome and balancing the state and federal law. The
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substantive, Erie continues to mandate application of state
law.58
C. THE REINTRODUCTION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO THE
ERIE ANALYSIS
Although Erie's abolition of federal general common law in
diversity cases5 9 has been almost untouched by the evolution of
the Erie doctrine, recent commentaries and cases have put for-
ward arguments for limited reintroduction of federal common
law in diversity suits. Several commentators have suggested
that federal courts, in accordance with constitutional grants of
power and the Rules of Decision Act, can establish federal com-
mon law which will prevail over conflicting state law.60 In fact,
federal courts have created substantive law applicable in diver-
sity cases in three clearly defined areas.61 First, the United
States Supreme Court has created common law to protect
Hanna decision does not clarify the balancing of state and federal interests,
which is central to Byrd. Several courts since Hanna have explicitly balanced
interests, relying on Byrd, especially in matters of judge and jury decisions.
See id. § 4504, at 43.
58. Substantive law is defined as law bound up with the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties and which defines the remedies available for redress. See
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38. In Erie the issue was substantive because it involved
the duty of care owed by a railroad to a trespasser or licensee. See Hanna, 380
U.S. at 472.
59. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
60. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27,
§ 4505, at 44-61 (since Erie, federal courts have established rules of substantive
law, even acknowledging they are creating federal common law); Ely, supra
note 40, at 723 (federal rule can displace state law if state rule entails no sub-
stantive policy); Fields, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARv. L. REV. 881, 923-46 (1986) (Erie's emphasis on transgressing bounds
of federal power supports view that Court's concern was use of federal judicial
power that exceeded congressional power); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (Erie has
led to emergence of federal law in areas of national concern); Westen & Leh-
man, supra note 51, at 334-36 (courts must conform legislative policy to polit-
ical morality for which it speaks).
61. The new federal common law differs from the court-made general
common law in the pre-Erie cases because it has been limited to matters of
federal importance over which the federal government has constitutional au-
thority, but which Congress has not addressed. C. WRGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 27, § 4505, at 58, § 4514, at 223-24.
The Supreme Court has also held federal statutory law controlling when
state and federal law conflict. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), the Court applied the Erie analysis to the question of
whether the United States Arbitration Act could be enforced in a diversity
case. The Court upheld application of the Act because it is "based upon and
confined to the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate
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uniquely federal interests, primarily when the United States is
a party to an action.62 Second, the Court has invoked federal
common law to protect strong national concerns, such as mat-
ters affecting foreign relations.63 Third, federal courts have de-
veloped federal common law to fill the interstices of a
pervasively federal system of substantive laws, such as the la-
bor law area, when Congress has given the Court this power.64
Building on these cases, the Rhode Island federal district
court held in Moretti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Associ-
ates65 that the use of federal law to enforce a forum selection
clause was justified as an instance of filling the interstices of
the pervasively federal framework of venue law.66 Despite its
novel use of federal common law, however, Moretti failed to
give more than passing attention to the constraints of the Erie
doctrine. A detailed Erie analysis remained unexplored prior
to Ricoh.
II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S ERIE
ANALYSIS IN RICOH
The decision in Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.67 is
the first federal circuit court opinion to go beyond cursory men-
commerce and over admiralty."' Id. at 405 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924)).
Article HI and the necessary and proper clause of article I may also give
courts power to establish substantive law in areas in which the issues are ar-
guably, but not clearly, procedural. See C. WRiGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 27, § 4505, at 47.
62. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943)
(holding that negotiability of United States government checks is matter of
federal law).
63. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964)
(concluding scope of act of state doctrine must be determined by federal law).
64. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)
(stating that federal interpretation of federal law will govern in suits derived
from federal labor law).
65. 668 F. Supp. 103 (D.R.I. 1987).
66. Id. at 105; see also D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Syss., 570 F. Supp.
708, 711 (D.R.I. 1983) (applying federal law to determine enforceability of fo-
rum selection clause).
Venue in federal courts is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1407 (1982). 28
U.S.C. § 1391(a) provides: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only
on diversity of citizenship, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants re-
side, or in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1982). See supra note
18 for the text of statutes governing transfer of venue.
67. 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert granted, 108 S.
Ct. 225 (1987).
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tion of the Erie doctrine in analyzing conflicts between state
and federal law regarding the enforceability of forum selection
clauses. The Eleventh Circuit addressed the enforceability of a
forum selection clause in diversity when such clauses violate
the public policy of the state where the suit is initiated.68 Iden-
tifying the threshold issue as whether state or federal law gov-
erns the enforceability of forum selection clauses, the court, in
a per curiam opinion, applied the Eie doctrine and held that
federal law governs.69
Noting that the purpose of forum selection clauses is to
designate venue for litigation, the opinion declared that venue
in diversity is "manifestly within the province of federal law."70
The court analogized the direct conflict of federal and state
procedural rules in Hanna v. Plumer71 and found the existing
federal venue rules equivalent to a federal procedural rule
which directly conflicted with the Alabama common law rule
against enforcement of forum selection clauses.72 Applying
Hanna, the court held that the federal rule controlled and fed-
eral law governed the enforceability of forum selection clauses
in diversity.7 3 The court then applied the reasonableness test
from The Bremen74 and held the forum selection clause in
Ricoh enforceable.7 5
Judge Tjoflat, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the de-
cision to transfer but rejected the need for traditional Erie
68. Id. at 1067.
69. Id. at 1068; see supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
70. 810 F.2d at 1068. The venue rules, however, are embodied in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1391-1490, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See infra note 90.
71. 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
72. 810 F.2d at 1068. The majority opinion specifically mentioned the fed-
eral venue rules at 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(3) & 4(b). Id.
73. 810 F.2d at 1069.
74. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1972); see
supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
75. 810 F. 2d at 1071. In particular, the court held that Alabama's judi-
cially created public policy against forum selection clauses did not justify deny-
ing enforcement of the clause under the reasonableness test because the policy
did not protect substantive rights. Id. at 1069-70. The court noted:
A closer look at Redwing reveals, however, that the Alabama
policy is for the protection of the jurisdiction of the state courts
rather than the protection of the state's citizens....
The Supreme Court of Alabama would not seem to be concerned
with the protection of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts lo-
cated in the state.... Since this case will be tried in federal court, the
protection of state court jurisdiction is not involved. There are simply
no federalism concerns ....
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analysis on the basis that no conflict between state and federal
law existed.7 6 According to the concurring opinion, the Ala-
bama policy against enforcing forum selection clauses was not a
rule of decision which Erie would require a federal court to ap-
ply in diversity,77 but merely an instruction to Alabama courts
on the exercise of their jurisdiction.7 8 Sidestepping Erie, Judge
Tjoflat argued that the court should presumptively enforce a
forum selection clause by transfer pursuant to the federal fo-
rum non conveniens statute.7 9
The dissenting judge in Ricoh, relying on an Erie analysis,
chose to apply state law and denied enforcement of the forum
76. Id. at 1071.
77. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
78. See 810 F.2d at 1075-76. Judge Tjoflat distinguished the rule in Red-
wing Carriers from substantive law, stating that "the decision merely prevents
litigants from tying the jurisdictional hands of the state courts." Id. at 1076.
79. Id. at 1071-72. Judge Tjoflat rejected Ricoh's motion for dismissal pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (improper venue) because the federal district court
had personal jurisdiction over Ricoh and was a proper venue. Id. at 1073; see
supra note 18, infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. The concurrence
found the forum selection clause in Ricoh enforceable, however, under the
reasonableness test from The Bremen. 810 F.2d at 1074-75. As a result, the
concurrence would transfer pursuant to § 1404(a), the statute which allows a
federal district court to transfer a case to another district "[flor the conven-
ience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1982); see also supra note 18 (text of venue statutes). Judge Tjoflat
reasoned that such a transfer comported with the aims of Erie because the
outcome of the case would not be altered by the transfer. 810 F.2d at 1072-73.
The concurring opinion relied upon Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
318 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), guaranteeing a plaintiff that a federal court will apply
the same substantive laws, including choice of law rules, as would courts of the
state in which it sits. Id. Moreover, the concurrence noted that the Supreme
Court, in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964), held that when a de-
fendant successfully moves to have a case transferred, the transferee court
should apply the same substantive law that the transferor court would have
applied, not the substantive law of the forum state of the transferee court.
Therefore, reasoned the concurrence, if the Ricoh case was transferred pursu-
ant to § 1404(a), the court in New York would apply Alabama law to decide
whether to enforce the choice of law clause in the contract, and "if Alabama
does not recognize such a provision, it will apply Alabama's conflict-of-laws
rules to discover what state's law should provide the rule of decision." 810
F.2d at 1072-73.
The concurrence further justified transfer under § 1404(a) as being in the
interest of justice, noting that transfer for convenience of the parties was not
appropriate because the parties had been compensated for inconvenience in
the process of negotiating for the forum selection clause. Id. at 1075.
The concurrence also found a conflict with supremacy clause concerns if a
state's public policy were held to control federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 1076
& n.9; see also Westen & Lehman, supra note 51, at 316 (discussing supremacy
clause).
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selection clause.80 Judge Godbold argued that the per curiam
opinion's reliance on Hanna was unfounded because no direct
conflict between procedural rules was at issue in Ricoh. He
pointed out that the federal venue rules, relied on by the court
to establish a Hanna conflict, are silent on the issue of antece-
dent agreements to limit venue.8' Applying the Byrd balancing
test8 2 and the aims-of-Erie analysis from Hanna,83 the dissent
concluded that application of federal law would encourage fo-
rum shopping and the inequitable administration of state
laws.84
III. THE APPLICATION OF ERIE AND FEDERAL
COMMON LAW TO FORUM SELECTION
CLAUSE ENFORCEABILITY
The Ricoh per curiam opinion provides an unsatisfactory
justification for enforcing forum selection clauses.a5 By apply-
ing federal law to forum selection clause enforceability in di-
80. 810 F.2d at 1077 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1076-77. In Judge Godbold's words, "28 U.S.C. § 1391 identifies
the courts that Congress... has defined as suitable to hear diversity cases."
Id. (emphasis in the original). Judge Godbold pointed out that the federal rule
in The Bremen conflicts with Alabama's rule against forum selection clause
enforcement, but that The Bremen is decisional, rather than a federal rule of
civil procedure or a statute, and therefore it cannot be employed in the Hanna
analysis. Id.
82. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. Judge Godbold's analy-
sis is explicated more fully in the Ricoh panel decision. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh
Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 645 (11th Cir. 1986) (Godbold, J., dissenting), qff'd per
curiam on rehearing en banc, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
225 (1987).
83. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
84. 810 F.2d 1066, 1076-77 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 225 (1987).
85. The analysis of the concurring opinion offers an equally unsatisfactory
solution to the issue before the court in Ricoh. Although the concurrence's
conclusion that § 1404(a) can be used to give effect to the parties' contractual
agreement on forum is appealing, it misses the mark in two ways. First, the
substantive purpose of the forum selection clause, to protect the parties' choice
of law, is not achieved by a § 1404(a) transfer because the transferee court
must apply the law of the transferor court. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612, 636 (1964). In Ricoh this means that the New York court must apply Ala-
bama law, despite the contractual agreement that the New York court would
apply New York law. See supra note 1. Choice of law is important because it
materially affects the interpretation of a contract. This is particularly true in
interstate contracts because several states' laws may have equal application to
the contract. Parties attempt to ensure predictability by including choice of
law clauses in their contracts. If the enforceability of the choice of law clause
is decided by choice of law rules in the original forum state, the forum selec-
tion clause loses one of its major values. In sidestepping Erie analysis, the con-
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versity cases, the court reached the correct result, but its
analysis in light of the current Erie doctrine is flawed. An al-
currence gives effect to only the convenience aspects of the Ricoh forum
selection clause and destroys the contractual agreement on choice of law.
Second, use of § 1404(a) makes enforcement of the forum selection clause
discretionary on the part of a judge in a noncontractual forum. Congress en-
acted the forum non conveniens statute to give district courts the discretion to
transfer cases to another district where venue is also proper, despite the plain-
tiff's choice of forum, to increase the efficiency of the court system. See Ricoh,
810 F.2d at 1071-72 (TIjoflat, J., concurring). Therefore, the concern in The
Bremen that giving effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties as
"manifested in their freely negotiated agreement," 407 U.S. at 12, is not fully
realized, nor is predictability of contracts appreciably increased. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, by proposing the use of § 1404(a) to effect the expectations
of contracting parties, the concurrence misapplies the "interest of justice" pro-
vision of the transfer rule. The section 1404(a) purpose of promoting the or-
derly and efficient disposition of litigation in federal courts is served by
transfers due to the inability to obtain an impartial jury or to the availability
of witnesses elsewhere, both of which provide grounds for granting a § 1404(a)
transfer. Enforcing the contractual agreement is a substantive issue, however,
which does not fall within the parameters of efficient court administration.
Theoretically, the interests of justice could include, for instance, substantive
concerns such as a federal court's preference for one state's law over another.
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected this position. In Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), the Court statech "The possibility of a change in
substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial
weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry." Id. at 247.
Contrary to Judge Tjoflat's conclusion, the application of § 1404(a) to en-
force forum selection clauses could also encourage forum shopping. If a
§ 1404(a) transfer is granted, a plaintiff who brought suit in a noncontractual
forum may have succeeded in changing the substantive law applied to the con-
tract. Plaintiffs may shop for a noncontractual forum where the substantive
law will not enforce the contractual choice of law.
This form of forum shopping is anathema to the Erie doctrine. Erie was
decided in response to abuse of the federal removal statute by out-of-state resi-
dents who removed to federal court to the detriment of state residents. Erie
protects state residents in much the same way as diversity was created to pro-
tect nonresidents from unfair treatment by state courts. See 304 U.S. at 74-75.
Section 1441 provides, in pertinent part: "[A]ny action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may
be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such ac-
tion is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
The discussion of the evils of forum shopping may seem ludicrous in this
context because the purpose of forum selection clauses is forum shopping.
The precontractual shopping, however, is an arm's length agreement based on
access to information and the weighing of comparative advantages and disad-
vantages of the various contract terms to the parties. Enforcing forum selec-
tion clauses and the contractual choice of law, once bargained for, would end
postcontract, prelitigation forum shopping and would not involve the unilat-
eral binding of one party after litigation begins. See Westen & Lehman, supra
note 51, at 374.
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ternative approach incorporating limited federal common law is
necessary to achieve the Ricoh court's result without distorting
the principles of Erie.
A. THE RICOH COURT'S APPLICATION OF ERIE
The Ricoh decision inaccurately applied the Erie doctrine
in reaching the conclusion that federal law governs the enforce-
ability of forum selection clauses in diversity. In particular, the
court misapplied Hanna v. Plumer.86 Under Hanna, when a
valid federal procedural rule directly conflicts with a state pro-
cedural rule, the federal rule governs.8 7 As the concurrence
coiTectly noted, however, there is no direct conflict of state and
federal rules relating to the enforcement of forum selection
clauses. 8 The court relied on general federal venue statutes to
establish the direct conflict between procedural rules required
by Hanna.8 9 Although the federal venue rules prescribe where
venue is proper 90 and provide for transfer of venue,91 they do
not say anything about the right92 of parties to choose an exclu-
sive venue for litigation prior to the commencement of an ac-
tion.93 The majority inappropriately lumped all existing federal
86. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
87. Id. at 473-74. The validity of the federal rule under the Rules En-
abling Act is the only test necessary when a direct conflict of state and federal
rules exists. Id. at 471. As provided by the Rules Enabling Act,
"The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process... and the practice and procedure of the
... courts ... of the United States in civil actions ....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right ....
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect."
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); see Westen & Lehman, supra note 51, at 316 (sug-
gesting federal rules must be both pertinent and valid).
88. See 810 F.2d at 1076 (Godbold, J., concurring); see supra notes 80-84
and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1982). In Ricoh federal courts in both Ala-
bama and New York as well as New Jersey had proper venue to hear the case.
91. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1982); see supra note 18.
92. A central question is whether the right to use a forum selection clause
to limit venue by specifying a single forum is a substantive or a procedural
right. The setting of venue by contract, if enforceable, reduces uncertainty
and allows litigation on substantive issues to proceed without extensive ma-
neuvering about venue. In this respect it can be regarded as procedural; see
also supra note 12 and infra text accompanying notes 98-102. Contractual fo-
rum selection, however, can be seen as substantive because the parties have
bargained for the clause.
93. See 810 F.2d at 1076-77 (Godbold, J., concurring). The venue rules do
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venue rules together to preempt the application of a state rule
which relates to, but does not control venue, thereby bootstrap-
ping the arguably procedural venue rules up to the level of a
Hanna directly applicable procedural rule.94 The majority's
discussion fails to heed the warning in Hanna not to read fed-
eral procedural rules too broadly9 5 and also gives courts the
green light to disregard state rules, thus contravening Erie. Be-
cause there is no federal procedural rule which addresses the
forum selection clause issue directly,96 Hanna does not control
the enforceability of forum selection clauses and the Ricoh
holding applying federal law is unsupported.97
The Ricoh court also characterized both forum selection
provide for voluntary waiver of jurisdiction by consent to venue, thereby ex-
panding the number of possible forums. C. WRIGHT, supra note 49, at 239.
Although the appellant Ricoh sought to analogize restriction of possible fo-
rums to expansion of possible forums, nothing in the rules explicitly allows
voluntary restriction of forums. Brief for Appellant at 19-20, Stewart Org. v.
Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-7231), cert granted, 108 S.
Ct. 225 (1987).
94. See 810 F.2d at 1067-69.
95. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
96. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The court in Hanna noted
that federal rules do not control if the issue is broader than the rule; but in
Ricoh, the rule cited by the majority-the venue rules as a whole-is broader
than the issue. Hanna leaves open the possibility that a direct rule conflict ex-
ists in this situation. A "directly on point" test for the conflicting rules, how-
ever, would better cover both situations.
97. Congress could make a rule to govern this issue but has not. Case law
is clear that courts cannot act to make law in areas in which Congress has au-
thority but has not acted. See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630,
641 (1981). Under the Rules Enabling Act, however, which mandates the
Supreme Court to establish rules for procedure, the Court might find author-
ity for common law rule-making. C. WRIGHT, A. M.L.ER & E. COOPER, supra
note 27, § 4514, at 217.
The majority also relied on case precedent in The Bremen and National
Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
[The contract [in Szukhent] contained in fine print both choice of fo-
rum and choice of law clauses, both favoring New York.... The
Court held this clause enforceable because it is settled, as the courts
below recognized, that parties to a contract may agree in advance to
submit to the jurisdiction of a given court.
Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1068.
The court also contended that The Bremen was not binding but was "nev-
ertheless instructive with respect to the growing judicial approval of choice of
forum clauses," 'id. at 1069, in support of the decision to apply federal law.
Bremen and Szukhent are inapposite as precedent that federal law should
govern under Hanna. The Bremen is not a federal procedural rule but rather
federal common law in admiralty with substantive and procedural aspects. See
supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. The Szukhent court explicitly
stated that it was not deciding the enforceability of forum selection clauses
under Erie in cases involving service of process on an agent.
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clauses and venue as procedural rather than substantive with-
out proper analysis. The Erie cases prohibit application in di-
versity of federal law that appears to be procedural but which
in reality changes substantive rights of citizens.98 Although a
forum selection clause may appear to be procedural at first
glance, it may well affect the substantive rights of parties, and
it is the product of a bargained-for agreement which is nor-
mally a substantive matter. The clauses are decidedly more
substantive than the service of process rules which were char-
acterized as a procedural housekeeping function in Hanna.9
Therefore, even if a direct conflict of rules had existed in
Ricoh, application of federal law might still contravene Erie.00
The procedural label is more easily applied to federal
venue rules1° ' than to forum selection clauses because venue
rules were enacted by Congress to regulate the operation of the
98. The Supreme Court has refused to apply federal rules in place of state
statutes of limitation, finding that to do so would change substantive rights
created by the states. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945); see
also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980) (holding F.R.C.P.
3 does not toll state statute of limitations); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1949) (same). In Walker the Court noted
that it was not the intended purpose of the federal rule to toll the state stat-
utes, but merely to start the clock for timing requirements of the federal rule.
446 U.S. at 750-51.
The Court, however, has applied federal rules regarding judge and jury is-
sues, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958) (requirement of jury
trial is "form and mode" of enforcing state-created rights and remedies), and
service of process, Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473 (describing service of process as
"housekeeping rule" of federal courts), when they relate to housekeeping
functions of the federal courts and do not change state-created rights or reme-
dies, despite some possibility of a difference in the outcome of the case. See
supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text. Byrd spoke of balancing the inter-
ests of uniform process against uniform outcome. See 356 U.S. at 537-38.
Erie requires careful evaluation of the facts and issues as well as identifi-
cation of the nature of the conflicting state and federal provisions. Erie's pur-
pose is to define the bounds of federalism. See supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text. By extending to state decisional law the same controlling
role in federal diversity cases as state statutory law enjoyed under Swift v. Ty-
son, Erie stands firmly for the idea that the outcome of litigation in a federal
court should be the same as it would have been in a state court when federal
jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship. See Guaranty Trust, 326
U.S. at 109.
99. See 380 U.S. at 463-64, 468. Forum selection clauses are included in
contracts to guarantee the choice of law and for convenience, availability of
witnesses, and costs of litigation. If the contractual choice of law is honored in
all venues, the outcome of the case should not differ.
100. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 18.
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federal court system.10 2 As a result, there is a strong federal
housekeeping interest in the venue statutes that argues for a
procedural designation. Conversely, the statutory nature of
venue rules raises doubts about their inclusion in the proce-
dural category, which is normally reserved for judicially devel-
oped rules of procedure. 10 3 The Ricoh court's failure to
adequately address this characterization problem diminishes
the decision's persuasiveness.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH USING LIMITED FEDERAL
COMMON LAW UNDER ERIE
A satisfactory resolution of the forum selection clause
quandary would promote uniformity to enhance contract pre-
dictability and would facilitate the fairness and federalism con-
cerns that underlie the Erie doctrine. By reaching the right
result--enforcing reasonable forum selection clauses-the Elev-
enth Circuit decision in Ricoh met the criteria of increasing
predictability of contracts. By incorrectly applying Hanna,
however, the court's holding opens the door to broad judicial
discretion in using federal rules to preempt state law, a result
which does violence to the fairness and federalism concerns of
the Erie doctrine.
To satisfy the concerns of Erie, federal courts should create
limited federal common law enforcing forum selection clauses
to fill the interstices of the federal court system. Application of
federal common law will resolve the forum selection clause en-
forceability issue in diversity. This approach is mandated by
the federal interests in enforcing forum selection clauses in di-
versity and the inability of a traditional Erie analysis to resolve
the issues raised by these clauses.
1. The Need for Uniform Enforcement of Forum Selection
Clauses
State law has traditionally governed contract issues. With
a continuing increase in interstate and international commerce,
however, federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction will
hear contract issues more frequently. 0 4 Application of state
102. See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir.) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987).
103. See supra note 48.
104. The amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction will
exclude increasingly fewer suits as inflation and commercial growth lead to
larger contract values.
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law in these diversity cases will result in widely varying en-
forcement of forum selection clauses because state law on the
matter is not uniform.1° 5 Recognizing a need for uniformity to
enhance the predictability of contracts and to effect the intent
of the parties, the majority of federal courts use The Bremen10 6
in favoring the prima facie enforcement of forum selection
clauses.10 7
The policy arguments in favor of uniform federal enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses in diversity are strong. In addi-
tion to the interest of the contracting parties in predictable
enforcement of their negotiated agreement, the strong federal
interest in controlling venue in federal courts, as evidenced by
the scope of the venue statutes, supports creation of a federal
standard governing the ability of parties to contractually limit
venue. The flexibility of the venue statutes in allowing transfer
of cases for the convenience of parties and courts also demon-
strates an accommodating approach to the location of litigation
that should allow prelitigation agreements on forum. As fur-
ther support, forum selection clause agreements to limit venue
are not substantially different from the approved practice of al-
lowing parties to consent to jurisdiction and thereby expand
venue. Finally, uniform enforcement of the clauses will en-
courage international and interstate commerce. 0 8
In contrast, the arguments against uniformity are not com-
pelling. In particular, a state court's parochial interest in
preventing jurisdiction ousting is not the type of substantive
right that Erie sought to protect because the Erie Court was
concerned with protecting the rights of state citizens, not state
courts.1
0 9
2. The Incompatibility of Erie with Forum Selection Clauses.
Because state laws on forum selection clauses vary widely,
uniform enforcement of forum selection clauses in diversity can
only be accomplished by application of federal law. To reach
this result, courts must find an approach which does not violate
the Erie doctrine. Applying federal law in the manner em-
ployed by the Ricoh court, however, contravenes Erie. In fact,
105. See supra note 28.
106. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972).
107. See supra note 31.
108. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-14; C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 27, § 3803.1, at 20.
109. See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (11th Cir.) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987).
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a closer look at Erie reveals that its application to conflicts over
the enforceability of forum selection clauses in diversity may be
incompatible with Erie's operational rules as well as its under-
lying goals.
Assuming that enforcement of forum selection clauses is a
procedural issue, °0 the three Erie tests for weighing federal
and state interests do not provide an easy solution of the con-
flict presented in Ricoh. As demonstrated in the critique of the
Ricoh opinion, the narrow Hanna holding does not support the
application of federal law to forum selection clauses. 1" The
Byrd balancing test" and the Hanna dictum,113 both of which
modified the Guaranty Trust outcome-determinative test, are
also unsatisfactory when applied to forum selection clause en-
forceability conflicts between state and federal law.
Byrd balances the federal interest in uniform process in all
federal courts against the interest in uniform outcomes in all
courts within a state. In particular, Byrd held that federal law
governs in judge-jury conflicts because the judge-jury relation-
ship is essential to the character and function of federal
courts." 4 Forum selection clauses, however, address only
which court will hear the case and do not affect the character
and function of federal courts." 5
Attempts by federal courts to apply Byrd to balance state
and federal policies underlying conflicting rules have produced
110. See supra notes 31, 35 and accompanying text. Viewed in light of the
reasoning in other Erie cases, forum selection clause enforcement is a proce-
dural issue. Enforcement of the clause in Ricoh does not threaten to bar ac-
tion on the ultimate issue of breach of contract. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 465 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1945); Taylor
v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Venue
is a procedural matter governed in federal courts by federal rules. C. WRIGHT,
A. MLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 3804, at 28.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 88-97.
112. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958); supra notes 44-
45 and accompanying text.
113. 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). The Court modified the Guaranty Trust out-
come-determinative test by superimposing the twin aims of Erie. Id.
114. See 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). The Court in Byrd also found the possi-
bility of different outcomes to be minimal. Id. at 539-40. It is unclear whether
Byrd balancing should apply to issues other than judge-jury determinations.
See C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 4504 at 37 (analyzing
Hanna with reference to Byrd).
115. For the purposes of this Comment, the court process includes those
rules governing the housekeeping procedures within federal courts. In con-
trast, the court system encompasses the various federal courts, their relation-
ship to each other, and their jurisdiction.
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confusing results.1 6 This confusion is compounded by the fact
that Byrd is unclear on the type of federal interest that will
justify disregarding a state rule. In Ricoh the federal concern
for interstate and international commerce and the uniform op-
eration of federal venue rules could constitute a federal interest
that would prevail in diversity over a state rule that prohibits
forum selection clause enforcement. This is especially true
when the state interest is not bound up with substantive rights
of citizens.117 On the other hand, the federal venue rules are
not directly endangered by the state policy. In fact, rather than
closing the door to a hearing of the substantive issues in
Ricoh,118 the state policy of nonenforcement of forum selection
clauses merely affects where the case is heard. Without further
guidance, Byrd's failure to delineate which federal interests
outweigh state rules limits the usefulness of a pure balancing
test in forum selection clause enforceability cases.
The Hanna dictum is also unhelpful in resolving the con-
flict of state and federal law in forum selection clause enforce-
ability. According to the Hanna dictum, when faced with a
nondirect conflict between state and federal procedural rules,
courts should apply the Guaranty Trust outcome-determinative
test considered in light of the twin aims of Erie."9 The first
aim, discouraging forum shopping, is immediately problematic
116. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 4504, at 32-35
(discussing ambiguities arising from Byrd).
117. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
118. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CoOPER, supra note 27, § 4511, at 175-
89 (discussing Erie and matters not covered by civil rules); see also Szantay v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 66 (4th Cir. 1965) (state statute barring suit
not followed in diversity when state statute was not closely related to state-
created rights and obligations).
119. 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965). Enforcement of a forum selection clause
does not necessarily affect the ultimate outcome of the case on the merits,
although some change in outcome might result from differing resolutions of
choice of law issues. See Byrd, 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958) (possibility of different
outcomes does not preclude application of federal law). The cases using out-
come-determinative grounds to hold that state law governs have generally con-
cerned statutes of limitations in which application of federal law would allow
an action barred by state law to proceed in federal court. See Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 207-08 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1949);
Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107 (1945); supra note 98. Viewed alone,
the outcome-determinative test might support the application of federal law to
forum selection clause enforceability when the probability of a change in out-
come is low. Combined with the aims of Erie, however, the outcome-
determinative test does not permit a cogent resolution of the federal-state rule
conflict presented by the issue in Ricoh.
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in the Ricoh context. On the one hand, forum selection clauses
are the ultimate form of forum shopping. The parties explore
all possible forums and negotiate and agree on a single forum to
hear their potential contract disputes. On the other hand, once
the forum is agreed to and the clause is enforced, the forum se-
lection clause satisfies the Erie aim by prohibiting forum shop-
ping. Forum shopping is only possible by bringing an action in
contravention of the contractual agreement.
The Erie court was primarily concerned with forum shop-
ping between federal and state courts. 2 0 Applying state law in
diversity to enforcement of forum selection clauses will en-
courage forum shopping among federal courts as long as states
differ in their enforcement of the clauses.' 12 Applying federal
law to hold forum selection clauses prima facie enforceable,
however, may encourage forum shopping between federal and
state courts. In particular, nonresident plaintiffs who bring an
action in a state where the defendant resides can bind the de-
fendant to the state forum.122 A plaintiff who wishes to avoid a
forum selection clause will thus shop for such a forum in a
state which will refuse to enforce the clause. Thus some forum
shopping is possible regardless of whether state or federal law
is applied in diversity.
Avoiding inequitable administration of the laws, the second
aim of Erie, is also difficult to assess in the forum selection
clause context. Erie intended that the law of a state should be
administered uniformly to provide equal protection of the law
for citizens of the state in both state court and federal diversity
court.123 Application of federal law to the forum selection
clause in Ricoh does not conform to this intention because it ne-
gates the protection of a sthte law which opposes enforcement
of the clause. As was noted by the court in Ricoh, however, the
state rule was intended for the protection of the state courts,
not the protection of citizen rights. Protecton of state courts
120. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-77 (1938).
121. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 49, at 369 (criticizing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), because it decreased forum shopping within
states but increased forum shopping among states).
122. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Under the federal removal
statute, a nonresident plaintiff, by filing an action in state court, controls the
forum because the resident defendant cannot remove the case to federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). Resident plaintiffs, however, will have no incentive to
disregard the contractual forum and file in state court because nonresident de-
fendants are able to remove to federal court, where the contractual forum
would be enforced. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
123. 304 U.S. at 74-75.
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raises few equal protection concerns of the kind Erie sought to
avoid. 24
Another concern is that choice of law issues in forum selec-
tion clauses may create inequalities in the administration of the
laws. If the enforceability decision alters which state law will
be applied to the merits of the case, that change could be re-
garded as inequitably affecting the substantive rights of the
parties.us Yet it could be argued that the only inequity to the
contracting parties would be a failure to enforce a reasonable
forum selection agreement with its accompanying choice of
law.126
It is apparent, then, that none of the available Erie tests,
all of which were set forth by the Supreme Court prior to the
decision in The Bremen, offers any conclusive guidance in ana-
lyzing which law should govern forum selection clause enforce-
ability in diversity.
3. The Federal Common Law Approach
A new approach to the problem of forum selection clauses
is needed that will preserve uniformity in the federal courts
but avoid the entanglements of an Erie analysis. To preserve
uniformity, the most useful approach is the application of fed-
eral common law to enforce forum selection clauses in diversity
regardless of state policies on enforcement. Applying federal
law to forum selection clause enforceability would also produce
significant benefits for the federal court system. Although the
124. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir.) (en banc)
(per curiam), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987).
125. See Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (federal courts can-
not "deny substantive rights created by State law or create . . . substantive
rights denied by State law").
126. These difficulties in applying the twin aims of Erie to contractual fo-
rum selection agreements are in part a result of differences between tort and
contract cases. The purpose of forum selection clauses is forum shopping by
the contracting parties which culminates in mutual agreement on the forum.
See Ely, supra note 40, at 710-11 (discussing difficulties of applying Erie).
Erie and its progeny have involved torts, which present risks of forum
shopping quite different from the risks arising from contracts negotiated at
arm's length. In contracts, litigation is generally foreseen as a possibility. A
tort action arises unexpectedly. As a result, the need to protect contractual
parties from forum shopping is less than the need to protect unsuspecting tort
defendants. Thus, the importance of the twin aims of the Erie doctrine is sig-
nificantly weakened in cases involving contractual disputes. If the parties in a
tort action had anticipated litigation, they would have entered into a contract
to protect their interests and spell out remedies.
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process within federal courts, the Byrd Court's concern,127 is
not necessarily affected, application of federal law will enhance
the smooth operation of the federal court system by determin-
ing where cases can or will be heard. In addition, this expan-
sion of the rule-making power of federal courts should reduce
the amount of litigation regarding forum selection clause en-
forcement by adopting the uniform standard of the reasonable-
ness test from The Bremen. Moreover, no significant
substantive state interest opposes development of a federal
rule. The state laws against enforcement of forum selection
clauses were created to protect state court jurisdiction, which is
not a concern for a case in federal venue. Uniform federal en-
forcement of forum selection clauses would, therefore, have
only a minimal effect on the substantive rights and obligations
of citizens under state law.2s
To create federal common law in this area, courts might
draw from federal court precedent creating federal law to pro-
tect strong federal interests or to fill the interstices of a perva-
sively federal system of law.129 Using this approach courts
could declare that The Bremen's holding is a substantive federal
common law rule, applicable to federal and state courts alike.130
Such a declaration, however, would be an enormous departure
from Erie's abolition of federal general common law in diver-
sity cases. The Erie Court reacted negatively to the use of fed-
eral common law because the substantive outcome of a case
would be different if decided in federal rather than state court.
Since Erie, the Supreme Court has been willing to create sub-
stantive common law only in limited areas in which there is a
127. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes
116-17.
128. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
130. If forum selection clause enforcement is a substantive issue, federal
courts in diversity can only apply federal law if they choose to create new fed-
eral common law. Although Erie prohibits feileral general common law, it is
established that federal courts can, in limited areas, develop common law
which is applicable in diversity. One interpretation of Erie is that instead of
abolishing all federal common law, Erie only limited it to areas in which the
federal government has constitutional authority and also established that the
grant of diversity jurisdiction and the Rules of Decision Act could not serve as
grounds for creating federal common law. See Field, supra note 60, at 923-27,
982; C. WRiGHT, A. MnLER & E. CooPER, supra note 27, § 4514, at 257. Under
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal courts made common law
outside the sphere of authority granted to the federal goverment by the Con-
stitution. See Field, supra note 60, at 923; see also United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) (intersticial federal lawmaking).
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strong national interest or legislative history supporting the de-
velopment of substantive common law. 31 In view of these limi-
tations, creation of federal substantive common law, binding on
the states, seems unwarranted in spite of its benefits.
A less intrusive approach is judicial creation of procedural
common law enforcing forum selection clauses in federal courts
but not in state courts. 3 2 Adopting the reasoning in the Mo-
retti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Associates decision,133 that
131. Post-Erie federal common law has been created in three major areas.
See C. WRIGHT, A. MnLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 4514, at 223-24; supra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text. The creation of substantive federal com-
mon law to govern the enforceability of forum selection clauses does not fit
within any of the three areas identified by the courts as appropriate for com-
mon law. The Third Circuit has noted that no strong federal interest or policy
warrants displacing state law in interpreting forum selection clauses. General
Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1986).
Significantly, when federal common law is created, it is binding on state
courts through the supremacy clause of the Constitution. See C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 4514, at 219. Thus, the protection of the
federalist dual court system requires limiting the areas in which federal com-
mon law is created so that interference with state lawmaking will be minimal.
To establish the holding in The Bremen as federal common law applicable
in diversity suits, courts would have to exceed the current boundaries for com-
mon law. Although there are commentators who argue that it is not inconsis-
tent with Erie for the courts to do so, the Supreme Court has indicated an
unwillingness to expand federal common law. See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 642-46 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 312-13 (1981); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S.
77, 96-97 (1981); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 4514 at
274.
To find support for common law enforcement of forum selection clauses,
the court could invoke the commerce clause, which grants the federal govern-
ment authority over interstate commerce. Although this is a logical and
desireable approach from a policy standpoint, it would undo a settled rule that,
absent a significant national interest, courts will not make common law in an
area in which Congress has power to legislate but has failed to do so. See
Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641; see also Field, supra note 60, at 976-77.
132. See supra note 60. Should Congress find such a judicially created fed-
eral law unacceptable, it can reverse the decision by statutory enactment. See
Westen & Lehman, supra note 51, at 329 (holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1965), reversed in part by second Hickenlooper
Amendment).
Although this creation of new rules exceeds the current range of common
law development endorsed by the Supreme Court, it does not violate Erie.
Congress has the power to make rules for the federal courts, as it has done in
the venue rules. Congress also delegated to the Supreme Court the authority
to develop the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which Congress later enacted
as law. Should Congress disagree with common law or rules made by the
courts, it has the power to modify those rules with appropriate legislation. See
C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 4514, at 220.
133. 668 F. Supp. 103 (D.R.I. 1987); see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text.
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the courts can fill the interstices of a pervasively federal system
of venue with procedural common law, federal courts should
declare a new procedural federal common law rule that forum
selection clauses are prima facie enforceable in federal courts
and are to be evaluated under the reasonableness test of The
Bremen. In effect, many federal circuits have already created
such a procedural rule by applying the holding in The Bremen
to forum selection clauses in diversity without analyzing the
Erie question.1'4 The procedural common law approach avoids
the major drawback accompanying the creation of federal sub-
stantive common law by restricting the application of the fed-
eral law to federal courts only. Substantive federal common
law is binding on the states through the supremacy clause of
the Constitution. Courts could opt to restrict application of the
proposed procedural common law rule, however, to suits in fed-
eral court as they do with other federal procedural rules. If the
new common law rule that clauses are prima facie enforceable
in all federal courts'3 is not binding on the states, the few
states that currently refuse to enforce forum selection
clauses136 may continue their policy or choose to adopt the fed-
eral position to avoid putting their citizens at a disadvantage. 137
To promote necessary uniformity in the federal court system,
federal courts should have the power to declare forum selection
clauses prima facie enforceable.
The major drawback to a federal rule declaring forum se-
lection clauses prima facie enforceable is the potential for ineq-
uity, particularly when an out-of-state resident brings suit in
state court because the resident defendant cannot remove to
federal court to take advantage of the federal rule. Similar in-
equity for resident defendants already exists in the federal sys-
tem, however, because the federal removal statute bars removal
by resident defendants in other types of actions.138 The pro-
134. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
135. All but two circuits apply federal law now. See supra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text.
136. See supra note 28 (primarily southern states do not enforce forum se-
lection clauses).
137. Because the Alabama rule is for the protection of the courts' jurisdic-
tion, this virtual coercion is not to the detriment of the rights of citizens.
Eventually the Erie issue in forum selection clauses could not only be settled
but could disappear. An extension of this reasoning to other areas of law,
however, would severely limit the federalist purpose of diversity jurisdiction
to allow for creativity and experimentation in state lawmaldng. See Field,
supra note 60, at 968-70 n.386.
138. See Ely, supra note 40, at 712-13.
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posed rule does not, therefore, increase the burden on defend-
ants significantly. Moreover, the broad concern in the Erie
doctrine is fairness to the parties, and enforcing a contractually
agreed upon forum selection clause is fair if the clause itself is
reasonable.13 9
In conjunction with the creation of federal procedural com-
mon law enforcing forum selection clauses, a uniform method
for implementing transfer of cases to the contractual forum is
needed. Several courts, including the Eleventh Circuit in
Ricoh, have failed to identify the method of transfer. 140 Other
federal courts which have enforced forum selection clauses
have differed on whether to use the improper venue statute or
the forum non conveniens statute to transfer the case.141
The use of forum non conveniens transfer is not satisfac-
tory because it does not effect the agreement of the parties in
forum selection clause cases.'4 Most forum selection clauses
contain choice of law provisions in which the parties agree to
the law that will govern contract disputes. In a transfer under
forum non conveniens, however, the transferee court must use
the law of the transferor court, a forced choice of law that will
likely contravene the parties' intentions.
Judicial use of the improper venue statute, however, would
permit transfer of the case while maintaining the parties'
choice of law.143 Unlike a forum non conveniens transfer, an
improper venue transfer resolves choice of law issues according
to the state law of the transferee court. In the case of forum
selection clauses, this will be the court and law contractually
chosen by the parties.'"
As a result, courts should hold that improper venue exists
when the parties have stipulated a reasonable forum in advance
of litigation and an action is brought in the nondesignated fo-
139. See id.; Westen & Lehman, supra note 51, at 374. Any unreasonable-
ness in the clause itself can be evaluated using the test from The Bremen. 407
U.S. at 12-13. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 85.
143. See supra note 18. Section 1406(a) allows transfer or dismissal of a
case brought in the "wrong" district. Wrong district has traditionally been in-
terpreted to mean that the transferor court does not have jurisdiction. See
generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 3827, at 169-76.
144. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. See Central Contracting
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 1966); Moretti &
Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assocs., 668 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D.R.I. 1987).
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rum.145 Several federal courts, in transferring a case based on a
forum selection clause, have noted that the enforcement of the
forum selection clause does not oust the noncontractual court
of its jurisdiction, but rather gives it reason to decline to exer-
cise its lawful jurisdiction. 146 This reasoning supports interpre-
tation of improper venue to enforce forum selection clauses.
Through application of federal procedural common law and im-
proper venue transfer, courts can achieve uniformity and effect
the intent of the contracting parties who include forum selec-
tion clauses in their contracts.147
CONCLUSION
Forum selection clauses have received varied treatment by
federal and state courts. Several federal circuits have sought
uniformity by enforcing these clauses in diversity cases, but in
doing so they have inexplicably avoided any analysis under the
Erie doctrine. In Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp., the only
federal circuit court to apply Erie reached the right result in
145. See Moretti & Perlow Law Offwes, 668 F. Supp. at 105-06; D'Antuono
v. CCH Computax Syss., 570 F. Supp. 708, 710 (D.R.I. 1983). The D'Antuono
court argued that § 1406(a) applies to forum selection clause enforceability
questions because the plaintiff's choice of a noncontractual forum is "wrong,"
not merely inconvenient, and should not be allowed to stand. 570 F. Supp. at
710. To invoke § 1406(a), venue must be improper-that is, in the wrong divi-
sion or district. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 3827,
at 169; Buhl v. Jeffes, 435 F. Supp. 1149, 1151 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (filing in a dis-
trict where venue is improper is a prerequisite to transfer).
Currently, improper venue can only be used as the basis for a § 1406(a)
transfer when the transferor court has subject matter jurisdiction but lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. C. WRIGHT, A. MLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 27, § 3827, at 169-71.
146. See Pelleport Investors v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 280
(9th Cir. 1984). The purpose of § 1406 when it was enacted was to avoid injus-
tice. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962). The goal of the fed-
eral courts in seeking to apply federal law to enforcement of forum selection
clauses falls within this purpose by seeking to protect the expectations of par-
ties to a contract and to prevent one party from undermining those intentions
through forum shopping.
147. Recognition of judicial power to create procedural law is preferable to
mere statutory interpretation in resolving the forum selection clause issue, be-
cause it clarifies ambiguities in the development of the Erie doctrine. Combin-
ing the reasoning of the independent common law rule with the interpretation
of the improper venue statute provides an even stronger basis for prima facie
enforcement of forum selection clauses in diversity.
The combination of interpreting § 1406(a) so that suits brought in a non-
contractual forum are improper with the development of a federal procedural
law that forum selection clauses are enforceable would remove any doubt as to
the method of transfer to the contractual forum and protect the parties' con-
tractual choice of law.
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applying federal law but violated Erie principles in reaching
that result.
To enforce forum selection clauses while avoiding an incon-
clusive Erie analysis, federal courts should create limited fed-
eral common law. The newly created law should be procedural
rather than substantive to avoid intrusive application to state
courts. A procedural rule that forum selection clauses are
prima facie enforceable is a necessary component of a uniform
federal court system that recognizes the increased frequency of
contract litigation in federal diversity courts and operates to
further the promotion and expansion of trade and commerce.
To complete the protection of the contracting parties' in-
tentions, courts should transfer forum selection clause cases
pursuant to the improper venue statute, which requires applica-
tion of the parties' contractual choice of law in their selected fo-
rum. Combined with the suggested interpretation of the
improper venue statute, the new federal common law rule
would provide strong guidance for the courts and increased pre-
dictability for contracting parties.
Julia L. Erickson
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